Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the recent financial crisis. We conduct an event study of policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals to curtail FVA and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we expect especially positive reactions to the curtailment of FVA and impairment rules for banks that are relatively sensitive to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we investigate cross-sectional reactions to factors that potentially contribute to pro-cyclical contagion, including relatively (i) low regulatory capital, (ii) more assets recorded at fair value, (iii) poor asset liquidity, (iv) larger potential impairments, and (v) more trading assets. Finally, we expect banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values beyond those reported in financial statements to experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules.
We examine ten event windows related to FVA and impairment rules for financial institutions. We find that events that signaled an increased (decreased) probability that existing FVA standards would be relaxed (retained) generally produced positive (negative) abnormal stock price reactions for sample banks. As predicted, the magnitude of the stock price reactions was positively related to our proxy for individual bank's susceptibility to contagion. Further, stock price reactions were associated with specific attributes that could contribute to contagion, including banks' capital levels, holdings of illiquid assets and banks' likelihood of being subject to other-than-temporary-impairments. Finally, stock price reactions were negatively related to the absence of analyst coverage, our proxy for the weakness of banks' information environment. In sum, while stock market participants appeared to welcome relaxation of FVA and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008-09, the potential loss of fair value information was perceived to be significant for banks with a thin information environment. We believe our study informs the debate about the role of FVA in the recent financial crisis.
Introduction
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) states that a long-term objective is to use fair value (a.k.a., mark-to-market) accounting to measure and report financial instruments (see Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 159). However, critics argue that fair value accounting (FVA) has contributed to the worst economic crisis in the United States since the Great Depression (Hughes and Tett 2008; Johnson 2008; Rummell 2008 ). Speaking at a SEC panel on mark-to-market accounting and the market turmoil following the subprime crisis, William Isaac, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 1978 to 1985, blamed FVA for causing the financial meltdown that followed the subprime crisis (Katz, 2008) . 1 The International
Monetary Fund (2008, 127) worries that "investment decision rules based on fair value accounting outcomes could lead to self-fulfilling forced sales and falling prices when valuations fell below important thresholds (either self-imposed by financial institutions or regulation)." Theoretical models by Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005) and Plantin, Shin, and Sapra (2008) show that FVA has the potential of exacerbating contagion among banks (i.e., the spread of market shocks) potentially leading to a breakdown of the entire banking system. 2 In contrast, several commentators (e.g., Ball 2008 , CFA Center for Financial Market Integrity 2008 and Ryan 2009 ) suggest that relaxing FVA will lead to less timely and hence less informative disclosures about banks' financial soundness and as a result extend the duration of the financial crisis.
In this paper, we examine whether bank stock prices were affected by events that potentially changed the probability that policymakers would relax (or retain By examining stock price reactions to policy deliberations and decisions leading to these FSPs, we investigate the link between FVA and contagion and inform the debate about the role of FVA and impairment rules during a period of extreme financial turmoil. We believe our paper is among the first to examine whether investors, on balance, believed the alleged negative effects of FVA via reliance on fire-sale market prices in illiquid markets and the contagion caused by distress sales of assets potentially outweighed the benefits associated with having more timely mark-to-mark data for decision making. We directly test whether relaxation of FVA and impairment rules increased bank values during a financial crisis characterized by pro-cyclical contagion. We expect positive (negative) reactions to events that increased (decreased) the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed. 3 If these potential fire sale markdowns recorded under the original FVA rules did not reflect long run economic values, inefficient regulatory intervention and pro-cyclical contagion become more likely and equity values were likely to be destroyed. Alternatively, if investors on balance perceive that curtailing FVA or impairment rules could mask the underlying economics of banks, we could see relatively negative reactions to proposals that relax FVA or impairment rules. Thus, we also 3 While marking impaired assets to market was arguably required under then-existing FVA and impairment rules, the emphasis in practice was apparently to use the last transaction price or the last quoted price as the primary basis of estimating fair value in SFAS No. 157. The result was marking assets to 'fire sale' prices during the crisis. The subsequent FASB staff position, FSP No. FAS 157-4 (April 2009), provided guidance on determining fair value when markets were thin with the aim of avoiding marking assets to distressed fire sale prices -see the Appendix for more detail.
investigate the role of a bank's information environment on the stock price reactions to the deliberations leading to relaxation of FVA and impairment rules.
We examine ten event windows leading to the eventual adoption of new FVA and impairment rules. We find that four of seven events that signaled an increased probability that existing FVA standards would be relaxed produced significant positive abnormal stock price reactions for sample banks. We find that two of three events that signaled a decreased probability of existing FVA standards being relaxed exhibited significant negative abnormal stock returns. We also find a highly significant reaction when we combine all ten events into one event window using an indicator variable that equals 1 (-1) during each event window assumed to increase (decrease) the probability of suspension/modification of FVA or impairment rules, 0 otherwise. Our initial results suggest that (i) stock market participants viewed FVA and impairment rules to be value-relevant for banks during the recent economic crisis, and (ii) concerns about pro-cyclical contagion dominated concerns about the loss of fair value information, on average.
Next, we test for a relation between individual bank's susceptibility to contagion and their stock price reaction to subsequent events that led to relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. We construct a proxy for individual bank sensitivity to contagion by examining banks' stock price reactions to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a large money center bank, in mid-September 2008 -an event that arguably precipitated the financial crisis of 2008-09. Our proxy captures the market's assessment of bank susceptibility to contagion directly via the broken banking relationships with Lehman Brothers and indirectly via the market's forecast of the side effects of Lehman's failure on individual banks and on the banking system in general. We find that our proxy for contagion is associated with stock price reactions to events leading to the relaxation of FVA and impairment rules, i.e., banks that were most sensitive to contagion tended to reap the greatest benefit from relaxation of FVA and impairment rules.
Next, we identify additional bank-specific factors that potentially contribute to pro-cyclical contagion, including relatively (i) low regulatory capital, (ii) more assets recorded at fair value, (ii) poor asset liquidity, (iv) larger potential impairments, and (v) more trading assets. We find that the magnitude of stock price reactions to the relaxation of FVA and impairment rules was positively related to (i) banks being less than 'well capitalized,' (ii) poor asset liquidity, and (iii) banks' likelihood of being subject to potential other-than-temporary impairments related to the 2008-09 financial meltdown.
Finally, we predict that banks with a relatively weak information environment, proxied by the absence of analyst coverage, should experience more negative (or less positive) reactions to the potential loss of fair value information resulting from the relaxation of FVA and impairment rules.
Arguably, fair value accounting provides more timely and relevant information (Ball 2008 and Ryan 2009 We believe our study informs the debate about the role of FVA in the recent financial crisis.
The FASB has alleged that investors wanted more FVA because it provides more timely and relevant information than the cost-basis model. In contrast, bankers argued that FVA contributed to the credit crisis. The prior FVA literature (e.g., Barth, Landsman and Wahlen 1995; Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo 1995; and Cornett, Rezaee and Tehranian 1996) does not directly address the potential criticisms of FVA during a severe credit crunch, including the need to take impairments based on firesale prices driven by market illiquidity and the adverse contagion effects that FVA potentially causes.
On balance, our evidence suggests that when relaxation of FVA and impairment rules was discussed by regulators and the media, investors reacted as if pro-cyclical contagion would be reduced. Banks that benefited the most were those that were more susceptible to contagion, especially those that were less than well capitalized or were exposed to other-than-temporary impairments. However, banks with no analyst coverage experienced smaller positive stock price reactions suggesting that concerns about losing value-relevant information via relaxation of FVA are also valid.
Our paper is also related to emerging literature on the 2008 financial crisis in general (e.g., Beltratti and Stulz 2009; Diamond and Rajan 2009; Shleifer and Vishny 2009; Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer 2009 ) and on the role of FVA in that crisis in particular (Ryan 2009 , Laux and Leuz 2009 , Sapra 2009 ). In a time-series analysis spanning 1988 -2007 , Khan (2009 finds an association between systemic risk and the proportion of the banks' balance sheet that rely on fair value reporting, particularly during times of market illiquidity. Gartenberg and Serafeim (2009) fail to find a negative association between stock returns of banks during the fourth quarter of 2008 and their holdings of level 1 and level 2 fair value assets and hence conclude that FVA did not exacerbate the financial crisis.
None of these papers investigates the economic consequences associated with policymaker initiatives to relax FVA or impairment rules. Moreover, we exploit cross-sectional variation in banks' returns to these regulatory events to test fine-grained hypotheses related to the potential consequences of relaxing FVA.
Section 2 provides a brief background of fair value accounting in the banking industry, outlines events from September 2008 through April 2009 during the financial crisis that potentially affected the continuation of FVA and impairment rules and develops hypotheses about how these events affected bank stock prices. Section 3 describes our data sources, sample selection, research design and variable measurement. Section 4 presents the results of the overall reaction to fair value policy announcements.
Section 5 investigates whether the stock market reactions are a function of bank-specific characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
Background and hypothesis development

Fair value accounting in the banking industry
Accounting serves at least two key functions in the banking industry -an information role common to all public companies in the economy and a contracting role that has unique implications specific to banking. In its information role, FVA and impairment rules provide analysts and investors information about the current market value and riskiness of key bank assets and liabilities. This information can be especially important when markets are volatile and fair values diverge from their underlying historical costs. In its contracting role, accounting forms the basis for monitoring and contracting with regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Especially important are contractual minimum capital requirements defined by accounting numbers. 4 To the extent markets are volatile and regulators use FVA for both monitoring and contracts, intervention is more likely as banks hit thresholds that indicate concern about capital adequacy. Barth, Landsman and Wahlen (1995) find that banks violate regulatory capital requirements more frequently under fair value than historical cost regimes, but share prices do not fully reflect this additional regulatory risk.
2.2 Prior Literature on the stock market reaction to FVA rules Cornett, Rezaee and Tehranian (1996) and Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1996) investigate the stock price reaction of bank holding companies around events related to the promulgation of fair value accounting in the early 1990s. These two studies conclude that investors expect implementation of SFAS 105, 107, and 115 to decrease bank stock values. Cornett et al. (1996) hypothesize that sample banks' negative stock price responses result from SFAS 115's impact on bond covenants whereas Beatty et al. (1996) focus on both SFAS 115's impact on contracting and on bank regulation. Lys (1996) "The Board normally publishes an exposure draft of any proposed amendments to standards to invite comments from interested parties. However, given the requests to address this issue urgently in the light of market conditions, and after consultation with the Trustees of the IASC Foundation, the Board decided to proceed directly to issuing the amendments. In taking this exceptional step the Board noted that the amendments to IAS 39 relaxed the existing requirements to provide short-term relief for some entities. The Board also noted that the amendments were a short-term response to the requests and therefore the Board decided to restrict the scope of the amendments." (IASB 2008) Event window 2 ends on October 16, the day after the European Union's (EU) regulator's committee voted unanimously to accept IASB's emergency changes to mark-to-market rules. International FVA rules were clearly relaxed during this event window but, given the event did not change the rules for U.S. banks, it likely had little effect on the stock prices of U.S. banks. We include this event for completeness.
The third event window is centered on the three days before, during and after the first of two SEC-hosted roundtable discussions of mark-to-market accounting on October 29, 2008. The purpose of the round table discussions was to provide input to the SEC study mandated by the EESA of 2008 (see event window 1). While no formal rules were proposed, most panelists argued that SFAS 157, Fair Value Measurements, should be retained. While far from definitive given the event was a public forum, the opposition to relaxing FVA accounting rules likely reduced the probability of FVA being suspended.
The fourth event window is centered on the three days before, during and after the second of two SEC-hosted roundtable discussions of mark-to-market accounting on November 21, 2008. While no consensus was reached about the future of mark-to-market rules, Chairman Cox mentioned in his opening remarks that "at a minimum there are areas where fair value accounting could be improved."
While again not definitive given the event was a public forum, the Chairman's statement that FVA rules "could be improved" likely increased the market's probability assessment of FVA rules being relaxed.
The fifth event window is the three days centered on December 30, 2008 -the date the SEC issued its staff study of mark-to-market accounting. The study recommended that SFAS 157 be improved but that existing mark-to-market rules be retained. The staff's recommendations likely reduced the probability of FVA being suspended by the SEC Board.
The sixth event window is the three days centered on January 12 Thus, applying EITF 99-20 in an illiquid/distressed market can automatically result in an OTTI when the fair value is less than the cost basis, even though the management may have current information suggesting that the underlying assets are still expected to fully perform. FSP EITF 99-20-1 provided guidance to establish that it is inappropriate to automatically conclude that every decline in fair value represents an OTTI. It required further analysis and allowed managerial judgment to assess whether a decline in fair value suggests an OTTI, thereby allowing for more managerial discretion in recording
OTTIs. This event clearly relaxed impairment rules and gave managers the opportunity to avoid some OTTIs.
The seventh event window is the three days centered on February 18, 2009 -the date the FASB announced a project to improve measurement and disclosure of fair value estimates with the specific goal of providing more guidance on determining when a market is active or inactive, when a transaction is distressed, etc. We interpret the FASB's continued support for FVA as likely reducing the probability of FVA being suspended by policymakers. Table 1 provides data on the number of Google News and Google Blogs cites for each event and event window using search terms available from the authors. We caution the reader not to take the numerical data too literally. Rather, these data provide a sense of the amount of new coverage each step in the policymaking process received.
Overall market reaction to events signaling a change in FVA or impairment rules (H1)
We begin by examining the reaction of bank stocks to the above events that signaled potential changes in FVA or impairment rules. If FVA was harmful to banks in general during the recent period of economic instability because of increased probability of regulatory intervention (regulatory intervention hypothesis) or because illiquid assets are inappropriately marked to market (noisy information hypothesis), we should observe positive stock price reactions to events that signaled relaxation of FVA rules and negative reactions to announcements that supported current FVA rules.
Thus our first overall hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Events that potentially increase (decrease) the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed (retained) in the banking industry are associated with significant positive (negative) stock price reactions among banks.
We examine (i) each of the ten event windows listed in Table 1 separately and (ii) an overall event window for all event windows aggregated together. We aggregate individual event windows by assigning +1 (-1) to each event window assumed to increase the probability that FVA or impairment rules would be relaxed (retained).
2.5 Do banks that are more susceptible to pro-cyclical contagion have relatively large reactions to events signaling a change in FVA or impairment rules? (H2) Next, we examine the cross-sectional relation between bank susceptibility to contagion and stock price reactions to events that potentially changed the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed or retained. Credit markets became illiquid during the global economic crisis of 2008-09. Trades not backed by a stable government ceased to exist -except at 'fire-sale' prices in an inactive market. For example, a bank that needed to improve its regulatory capital ratio might be forced to sell mortgage-baked securities in the open market to move them from assets requiring large amounts of risk-based capital to cash or U.S. Treasuries that required little or no risk-based capital.
Other banks exposed to FVA rules that held similar securities were arguably required to write down their holdings to these fire-sale prices because of FASB guidance associated with FAS 157, "Fair Value Measurements." 7 This in turn caused capital adequacy ratios of some of these otherwise healthy banks to fall below 'well-capitalized' and forced these banks to curtail lending and sell assets in the inactive marketplace in an attempt to improve their capital ratios or risk costly regulatory intervention.
This 'pro-cyclical' contagion allegedly worsened the financial crisis as prices for securities prices fell and even more banks were forced to react to improve their regulatory capital. We predict that banks that were relatively more exposed to pro-cyclical contagion had stronger positive (negative) reactions to changes in the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed (retained). and interrelationships in the banking industry that could contribute to contagion.
2.6 Cross-sectional market reactions to events signaling a change in FVA or impairment rules (H3-H8)
Next, we examine the cross-sectional relationship between specific bank characteristics and the overall market reaction to events that potentially changed the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed or retained. We begin by identifying bank characteristics that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion, including relatively (i) low regulatory capital, (ii) more assets recorded at fair value, (iii) poor asset liquidity, (iv) larger potential impairments, and (v) more trading assets. Finally, we predict that banks with a relatively weak information environment, proxied by the absence of analyst coverage, should experience more negative reactions (or less positive reactions) to the potential loss of fair value information resulting from the relaxation of FVA and impairment rules.
Below, we discuss each explanation of cross-sectional bank returns.
First, we consider the adequacy of banks' regulatory capital. In December 1991, the U.S.
Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), which emphasized the importance of adequate capital buffers. One key provision of the FDICIA, Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA), involved early intervention in problem banks by regulators. PCA aims to resolve banking problems of inadequate capital early and at the minimum cost to the bank insurance fund. PCA uses three major ratios in the assessment of capital adequacy. These three ratios are (i)
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital ratio, (ii) Total Risk-Based Capital ratio and (iii) Tier 1 Leverage ratio.
Based on these ratios, banks are categorized by their regulatory capital into five categories:
"well-capitalized," "adequately capitalized," "undercapitalized," "significantly undercapitalized," or "critically undercapitalized." Well-capitalized banks are supposed to have sufficient capital to serve as a buffer from market swings. In contrast, market volatility can lead to swings in fair values such that regulatory capital is impaired and regulatory intervention is more likely for banks that are not wellcapitalized. Regulatory intervention can result in the dilution of equity values or even takeovers. We hypothesize that banks that are less than "well-capitalized" are more affected by changes in FVA or impairment rules. For example, when banks experience a positive reaction to events that can lead to relaxation of FVA or impairment rules, we expect a larger positive reaction from banks that are relatively poorly capitalized.
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of the stock price reactions to events that potentially changed the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed (retained) in the banking industry is relatively positive (negative) for banks that are less than 'well capitalized.'
Our proxy for banks that are less than well-capitalized, 'Not-well-cap,' is an indicator variable that assumes the value 1 if a bank is not classified as well-capitalized or better based on its regulatory capital ratios and 0 otherwise. That is, Not-well-cap assumes the value 1 if a bank is classified as adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, or critically undercapitalized.
Not-well-cap equals 0 if a bank is classified as well-capitalized.
Our second cross-sectional hypothesis considers banks' use of FVA. Banks that have relatively more assets denominated in fair values should experience relatively large positive (negative) reactions to changes in the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed (retained).
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of the stock price reactions to announcements that potentially changed the probability of FVA or impairment rules being curtailed in the banking industry is positively related to the bank's proportion of fair value assets.
We measure a bank's proportion of fair value assets, "FV_A to Total A," as the ratio of assets reported using fair value to the total assets of the bank. Assets reported at fair value include availablefor-sale securities, trading assets, loans and leases reported at fair value, other financial assets, and servicing rights reported at fair value.
Third, we consider bank exposure to pro-cyclical consequences of illiquid assets reported at fair value. As discussed above, credit markets became illiquid during the financial crisis of 2008-09.
Pro-cyclical contagion allegedly contributed to the financial crisis as prices for securities fell in the inactive market and more banks were forced to react to improve their regulatory capital. We predict that banks with relatively large amounts of illiquid assets reported at fair value were more exposed to pro-cyclical contagion and had stronger reactions to changes in the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed (retained).
Hypothesis 5: The magnitude of the stock price reactions to announcements that potentially changed the probability of FVA or impairment rules being curtailed in the banking industry is positively related to the bank's amount of illiquid fair value assets.
Our measure for the amount of illiquid fair value assets, "Illiquidity," is the sum of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets scaled by total assets of the bank. Level 2 assets' fair values are based on models that use market inputs. So, if the markets are not functioning properly and market inputs are used in valuing these assets, the models essentially result in fire-sale prices. Level 3 assets are the most difficult for banks to measure at fair value -generally because there is no active market for these assets. As a result, unobservable inputs must be used to model their values. The models used to value these assets require a "liquidity risk factor" and the result is valuations that generally are not much different from recent fire-sale prices (Mortgage Bankers Association 2009). Thus, we predict that firms with a higher proportion of their assets classified as level 2 and level 3 fair value assets are more susceptible to write downs and pro-cyclicality as they mark down their assets to the recent fire-sale price. Our measure for potentially impaired securities, "BTM_Securities," is the book-to-market ratio of a bank's debt-securities portfolio. BTM_Securities equals the sum of amortized cost of held-tomaturity securities and available-for-sale securities scaled by the total fair value of held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities.
Fifth, we examine the effects of potentially inconsistent application of FVA across banks applying U.S. GAAP. If an asset is classified as a trading asset, the bank is required to report the asset at fair value on a recurring basis on the balance sheet and recognize any change in fair value in earnings. On the other hand, if the same asset is classified as an available-for-sale security, the bank reports the fair value of the asset on the balance sheet, but changes in fair value are not recognized in earnings unless the impairment is permanent. Thus, similar or even identical assets can have different effects on earnings and regulatory capital depending on their classification as trading versus availablefor-sale. Prior to FSP No. FAS 157-4, which provided additional guidance for determining fair value of assets in illiquid markets or distressed transactions, a bank that classified an asset as a trading asset was arguably required to take an instant write-down if the market value of the asset declined even though the new price of the asset was from a distressed/fire sale. On the other hand, a bank that classified the same asset as an available-for-sale security would take a write-down only if the decline in the market value was other-than-temporary. Accordingly, we expect that banks with relatively large amounts of trading assets will have more positive reactions to changes in the probability of FVA rules being relaxed. Our measure for the amount of trading assets, "Trading_A to Total A," is total trading assets scaled by total assets of the bank.
Our last cross-sectional factor considers aspects of individual bank's information environment.
FVA arguably provides investors more timely and relevant information about the current market value of banks' assets and liabilities (Ball 2008 , Ryan 2009 
Methodology
Stock price reactions
Bank-specific stock returns are commonly modeled using a two-factor model that controls for the market return and interest rate changes, e.g., see Flannery and James (1984) and Beatty et al. (1996) . Therefore, to test H1, we use a two-factor model in which firm-specific returns are regressed on the CRSP equally-weighted daily return, on a variable capturing interest rate changes, and on ten event dummy variables as specified in Table 1: RET it = α 0 + β 1 Mkt_Ret t + γ 1 ∆T-Bill t + δ 1 FV_Window t + ε it
Where RET it = daily stock return for firm i, Mkt_Ret t = CRSP equally-weighted daily return, ∆T-Bill t = daily change in 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rate, FV_Window t = indicator variables that allow for mean shifts in returns on event days.
Each event window is specified as follows. FV_Window assumes a value of 1 on the day before, the day of, and the day after the event date(s) listed in Table 1 . If two or more event periods overlap, the event window extends from the day preceding the first event to the day following the last event. In total, we examine ten event windows leading to the eventual adoption of new FVA and impairment rules. We report results using two different specifications of FV_Window. First, we allow δ 1 to vary by event (FV_Window_n) and report stock price reactions for each event window.
Second, we report the stock price reaction for all events aggregated together (FV_Window_Combined)
by setting FV_Window equal to 1 (-1) on announcement days assumed to increase (decrease) the probability of suspension/modification of FVA or impairment rules, 0 otherwise. To assess the statistical significance of the stock price reactions, we cluster standard errors by time (i.e., by trading day) to produce robust t-statistics (see Petersen 2009 ).
Cross-sectional analysis
As discussed earlier, we also test for cross-sectional variation (hypotheses H2-H8) in banks stock price reactions to deliberations leading to adoption of new FVA and impairment rules. Since cross-sectional dependence in security returns can produce 'too many' statistically significant t-values in event studies (Leftwich 1981) , we use a procedure suggested by Sefcik and Thomspon (1986) . 8 The advantage of the Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach is that it yields valid standard errors as it accounts for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation of the residuals which is likely to occur in the presence of common event windows for all sample firms. To illustrate how the Sefcik and 
where:
Not-well-cap = 1 if a bank is classified as not "well-capitalized," 0 otherwise, i.e., a bank is classified as not well-capitalized for any category worse than "wellcapitalized," including "adequately capitalized," "undercapitalized" or "significantly undercapitalized" or "critically undercapitalized."
FV_A to Total A = ratio of assets reported at fair value to total assets, i.e., the sum of availablefor-sale securities, trading assets, loans and leases reported at fair value, other financial assets and servicing rights reported at fair value, scaled by total assets. Illiquidity = sum of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets scaled by total assets. BTM_Securities = the sum of amortized cost of held-to-maturity securities and available-forsale securities scaled by the sum of the fair value of held-to-maturity securities and available-for-sale securities.
Trading_A to Total A = Trading assets scaled by total assets.
Analyst Coverage = 1 if a bank has analyst coverage over the 12 months prior to Sep 2009, 0 otherwise.
The Sefcik and Thompson (1986) procedure creates a portfolio for each cross-sectional 8 An alternate approach is a two-step procedure that involves regressing event period residuals on proxies for the different determinants of cross-sectional variation. However, this approach may yield invalid standard errors.
hypothesis (plus the intercept). Thus, we have seven portfolios constructed from sample firm returns, and time-series regressions in equation (1) are performed using weighted-portfolio returns as the dependent variable. 9 To obtain weighted-portfolio returns we define two matrices: (i) a t x j matrix, R, of returns where t is the number of periods and j the number of firms, and (ii) a j x k matrix, F, where k represents the number of determinants of cross-sectional variation plus the intercept. Finally, we estimate (F'F) -1 F'R' to get a matrix of weighted-portfolio returns (see Sefcik and Thompson 1986 for a full discussion). The equation below represents the portfolio time-series regressions:
where i ranges from one to seven and t equals the number of trading days in our sample period (i.e., 150).
The significance of a firm-specific characteristic in a cross-sectional regression is assessed by examining the t-statistics of the coefficient on FV_Window_Combined in the above system of equations. For example, to assess whether banks that are not well-capitalized had a more positive stock price reaction to events that signaled an increase in the probability that existing FVA and impairment rules would be modified, we examine whether b 1 in the above system of equations is positive and statistically significant. 9 In all results reported in the paper, the FV_Window coefficients, δ 1 , examined in our cross-sectional analyses are those from firm-specific regressions of (1) Table 3 assumes that reporting under then-existing FVA and impairment rules was perceived as harmful to most banks during this period of economic instability. Given our events are aligned in calendar time and firms are all in the same industry, we use relatively short windows to better isolate the effects of each event. We acknowledge that, to the extent that the market did not quickly sort out the relative exposure of banks to potential changes in FVA and impairment rules, the entire market reaction may not be captured.
In Panel A of Table 3 , the sign of the market reaction was as predicted for nine of the ten events; event window four is the only exception. On average, banks had significant positive reactions to four of seven events associated with relaxing FVA or impairment rules and significant negative reactions to two of three events signaling current FVA or impairment rules would be supported.
Panel B of Table 3 presents results on the overall stock market reaction for all event windows aggregated together by assigning +1 (-1) to each event window assumed to increase the probability that FVA or impairment rules would be relaxed (retained). The overall reaction was positive and significant (p = 0.001). 11 On average, our results suggest that stock market participants viewed changes that relaxed (retained) FVA or impairment rules as positive (negative) for banks. Overall, our results are consistent with stock market participants viewing fair value accounting rules to be valuerelevant for banks during financial crisis of 2008-09. If market perceptions capture the underlying economics, then existing FVA and impairment rules appeared to be harmful on average to banks during this crisis.
Do stock market reactions to fair value announcements vary in the cross-section with individual bank's susceptibility to contagion? (H2-H8)
While our stock market reaction tests discussed above indicate a significant relation between potential changes in FVA/impairment rules and bank equity values, we next explore the link to contagion among banks during the financial crisis of 2008-09. Recall that contagion is the process whereby arguably independent shocks at one bank spread like a disease to other banks, and in the extreme, potentially lead to a breakdown of the entire banking system. In this section we address whether contagion among banks was exacerbated by FVA and impairment rules. In section 5.1, we conduct an overall test of the relation between contagion and banks' stock price reactions to potential changes in FVA and impairment rules. We investigate bank characteristics that potentially affect contagion in section 5.2, and consider the countervailing effect of potentially losing fair value information in section 5.3.
Overall test of contagion (H2)
In H2, we examine the overall cross-sectional relation between bank susceptibility to contagion and market reactions to events that potentially changed the probability of FVA or impairment rules being relaxed or retained. Recall that we measure individual bank sensitivity to contagion by assigning a scaled rank to each bank based on its stock price reaction to the collapse of Lehman
Brothers from September 12, 2008 to Sep 15, 2008 (where September 13 and 14 were non-trading days). We assume that banks that had relatively negative stock price reactions to Lehman's collapse are more susceptible to contagion. We rank individual bank's stock return reactions from most negative to most positive and scale them by the total number of banks in the sample (i.e., 288) and label this variable 'Contagion.' Table 4 presents results on our overall cross-sectional test of the relation between bank susceptibility to contagion and market reactions to events that signaled potential changes in FVA or impairment rules. Table 4 summarizes the estimated coefficients of the signed-mean market reaction (FV_Window_Combined) from two different regressions -one for the intercept and one for Contagion, as described in the methods section. Each of these regressions is a time-series regression with the portfolio weight based on a cross-sectional proxy as a dependent variable and market return, change in Treasury bill rate and signed-mean as the independent variables. We find that Contagion is positive as predicted and significant (p = 0.076), consistent with interdependencies across the banking industry and suggesting that banks more susceptible to contagion are also the ones that would benefit most from relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. We consider more fine-grained factors that potentially contribute to contagion in the next section.
Components of contagion (H3-H7)
In this section we examine five bank characteristics that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion during the financial crisis of 2008-09: (i) low regulatory capital (H3), (ii) more assets recorded at fair value (H4), (iii) poor asset liquidity (H5); (iv) larger potential impairments (H6); and (v) proportion of trading assets relative to total assets (H7). Table 5 summarizes the estimated coefficients of the signed-mean market reaction variable (FV_Window_Combined t ) from seven different regressions, as described in the methods section.
Again, each of these regressions is a time-series regression with the portfolio weight based on a crosssectional proxy as a dependent variable and market return, change in Treasury bill rate and signedmean as the independent variables. Consistent with H3, we find that the magnitude of stock price reactions to the relaxation of FVA and impairment rules was positively related to banks being less than 'well capitalized' and marginally significant (p = 0.102). Perhaps not surprisingly given U.S. GAAP is used for regulatory purposes, concerns about regulatory capital appear to have affected investors' reactions to potential changes in FVA and impairment rules. Inconsistent with H4, we find no evidence that the ratio of fair value assets to total assets was associated with stronger reactions to changes in FVA and impairment rules. Consistent with H5, we find that market reactions to changes in FVA and impairment rules were positively associated with the amount of illiquid (level 2 plus level 3 fair value) assets subject to market value tests and thus more exposed to pro-cyclical contagion as other banks marked down their assets to fire sale prices (p = 0.075). Consistent with H6, we find that market reactions to changes in FVA and impairment rules were significantly associated with banks' likelihood of being subject to other-than-temporary impairments related to the 2008-09 financial meltdown (p = 0.064). Finally and inconsistent with H7, we find no evidence that the extent of trading assets was associated with stronger reactions to changes in FVA and impairment rules. In summary, of the five bank characteristics we identify, three are at least marginally significantly associated with market reactions to potential modifications to FVA or impairment rules: (i) being less than 'wellcapitalized' (Not-well-cap); (ii) the extent of illiquid assets on their books (sum of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets) and (iii) the likelihood of other-than-temporary impairments (BTM_securities).
Do investors care about the potential loss of fair value information? (H8)
Finally, we investigate whether the potential loss of fair value information harms banks with a relatively weak information environment. We proxy for a weak information environment by the absence of professional analyst coverage. We argue that banks with no analyst coverage are likely to have fewer alternative sources of information and investors in these banks are more likely to be harmed by the potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. We find that banks without analyst coverage experience significantly smaller (larger) positive reactions (p = 0.023) to events suggesting relaxation (retention) of then existing FVA and impairment rules. This is consistent with investors in banks without analyst coverage being concerned they would not be able to rely on analysts' expertise to compensate for the loss of value-relevant fair value information. Hence, the positive coefficient on analyst coverage can be interpreted as evidence consistent with views that relaxing FVA and impairment rules will lead to less timely and less informative disclosures for at least some banks (e.g., 
Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2008-09 arguably led to a near meltdown of the U.S. banking system.
Then existing FVA and impairment rules were alleged to contribute to the crisis by exacerbating procyclical contagion by effectively requiring banks to mark down many of their assets to fire sale prices.
For example, assume a bank has to sell assets at fire sale prices due to a shortfall in regulatory capital.
This, in turn, can force other banks to mark their similar assets to these declining prices, causing some of these otherwise healthy banks to sell assets and curtail lending in an attempt to maintain adequate regulatory capital.
We examine stock price reactions to policy deliberations and decisions related to FVA and impairment rules during the financial crisis. In doing so, we examine the link between FVA and contagion, and inform the debate about the role of FVA and impairment rules during a period of extreme financial turmoil. We find that four of seven events that signaled an increased probability that existing FVA standards would be relaxed produced significant positive abnormal stock price reactions for sample banks. We find that two of three events that signaled a decreased probability that existing FVA standards would be relaxed exhibited significant negative abnormal stock returns. We also find a highly significant reaction when we aggregate all ten events into one window. Thus, on balance, investors apparently acted as if the potential negative effects of then existing FVA and impairment ruled outweighed the benefits associated with having more timely and hence transparent mark-to-mark data for decision making.
In cross-sectional tests, the distribution of stock price reactions was consistent with investors worrying about contagion among banks. Banks that were most susceptible to contagion tended to garner the greatest benefit from relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Further, when we looked at five bank characteristics that could contribute to contagion, we found that the magnitude of stock price reactions to the relaxation of FVA and impairment rules was positively related to (i) banks being less than 'well-capitalized'; (ii) banks with more illiquid assets; and (ii) banks' likelihood of being subject to other-than-temporary impairments related to the 2008-09 financial meltdown. These three factors are consistent with stock market participants worrying about the effects of FVA and impairment rules on their investments. However, investors of banks with no analyst coverage reacted less positively to the events that relaxed FVA suggesting that FVA also provides timely and informative disclosures about the banks' financial soundness. In sum, the evidence is consistent with opposing views related to relaxing FVA, i.e., market participants act as if FVA encourages contagion but also provides more informative disclosures for at least some banks.
While our research indicates that market participants acted as if FVA and impairment rules where hurting banks on average during the financial crisis, it does not address the question, "Which is best -FVA or cost-basis accounting?" Throughout this period, regulatory accounting principles (RAP) largely relied on U.S. GAAP. Hence, one might argue that had regulators used separate cost-basis RAP, political and market reactions to U.S. GAAP FVA and impairment rules would likely have been muted. However, research by Hill and Ingram (1989) and Blacconiere et al (1991) reminds us that Savings and Loans (S&L) strategically used regulatory accounting principles ("RAP") when it would benefit the firm or management. Under then existing RAP, S&Ls were permitted a number of accounting devices that seemed to increase their capital, including the ability to record present gains at fair value, but defer losses on securities or loans already sold -a clear departure from GAAP. Hence, decoupling RAP from GAAP may not be a panacea either.
Further, our tests do not necessarily suggest that FVA is 'worse' than cost basis accounting for regulatory purposes. As we discussed above, investors in banks with less access to alternative information sources did not react as enthusiastically to policymakers' efforts to relax FVA. Hence, it is possible that FVA merely accelerates the price and resource allocation adjustment processes resulting in a relatively speedy return to financial stability.
assess whether the entity (a) has the intent to sell the debt security, or (b) more likely than not will be required to sell the debt security before its anticipated recovery. If either of these conditions is met, the entity must recognize an OTTI. Further, in instances in which a determination is made that a credit loss exists but the entity does not intend to sell the debt security and it is more likely than not that the entity will be required to sell the debt security before the anticipated recovery of its remaining amortized cost basis, the impairment is separated into (a) the amount of the total impairment related to the credit loss, and (b) the amount of the total impairment related to all other factors. FAF is an independent, private-sector organization responsible for oversight of the FASB and is committed to protecting investor interests through protecting the independence and integrity of the standard-setting process.
acknowledges that IASB was forced to amend rules due to political pressure. Total Assets = Total assets in thousands of U.S. dollars Book Value of Equity = Book value of equity in thousands of U.S. dollars Market Value of Equity = Market value of equity in thousands of U.S. dollars BTM_Securities = the sum of amortized cost of held-to-maturity securities and available-for-sale securities scaled by the sum of the fair value of held-to-maturity securities and available-for-sale securities Not-well-cap = 1 if a bank is classified as not "well-capitalized," 0 otherwise, i.e., a bank is classified as not well-capitalized for any category worse than well-capitalized, including "adequately capitalized," "undercapitalized" or "significantly or critically undercapitalized"
FV_A to Total A = ratio of assets reported at fair value to total assets, i.e., the sum of available for sale securities, trading assets, loans and leases reported at fair value, other financial assets and servicing rights reported at fair value, scaled by total assets
Trading_A to Total A = Trading assets scaled by total assets Illiquidity = The sum of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets scaled by total assets Analyst Coverage = 1 if a bank has analyst coverage over the 12 months prior to Table 3: a Individual events and event windows are described in Table 2 . Event dates ending on a weekend day are truncated to the subsequent day if it is the first date in the range or to the prior day if it is the last date in the range. b t-statistics are clustered by date to control for cross-sectional correlation. c P-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions, two-sided otherwise. Coefficients on treatment variables that are significant at less than the 10% level are shown in bold. We report (1 -(p/2)) values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted.
Definition of variables:
RET i,e = cumulative raw return for bank 'i' on the range of dates specified for event 'e,' e.g., for event 1, the cumulative raw return for bank 'i' for the period 9/28/08 through 10/3/08 is RET i,1 . Mkt_Ret = equally weighted return from CRSP, a portfolio of all publicly held U.S. stocks. ∆T-Bill = change in the daily 3-month U.S. Treasury-bill secondary market rate. Source is Federal Reserve of St. Louis. FV_Window_n = an indicator variable that equals 1 (-1) during each event window assumed to increase (decrease) the probability of suspension/modification of FVA or impairment rules, 0 otherwise. Event window days are specified in table 2. FV_Events_Combined = an indicator variable that equals 1 (-1) for all combined event window days assumed to increase (decrease) the probability of suspension/modification of FVA or impairment rules, 0 otherwise. Sefcik and Thompson (1986) weighted portfolio approach where the weights are based on the variables in the first column. Events with an expected negative sign are multiplied by -1 to produce a consistent positive-signed combined event.
Model: Ab_RET i = β 0 + β 1 Contagion i + ε
Independent Variables
Predicted Sign Table 4: a Individual events and event windows are described in Table 2 . b P-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions, two-sided otherwise. Coefficients on treatment variables that are significant at less than the 10% level are shown in bold. We report (1 -(p/2)) values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted.
Definition of variables:
Ab_RET i = cumulative abnormal return for bank i for the combined range of dates across all events described in Table 2 . Contagion = the scaled rank assigned to each bank based on its stock price reaction to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Stock return reactions to Lehman's collapse are summed from September 12, 2008 to Sep 15, 2008 (where September 13 and 14 are non-trading days). Bank's stock return reactions are ranked from most negative to most positive and scaled by the total number of banks in the sample (i.e., 288). Table 5: a Individual events and event windows are described in Table 2 . b P-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions, two-sided otherwise. Coefficients on treatment variables that are significant at less than the 10% level are shown in bold. We report (1 -(p/2)) values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted.
Ab_RET i = cumulative abnormal return for bank i for the combined range of dates across all events described in Table 2 . Not-well-cap = 1 if a bank is classified as not "well-capitalized," 0 otherwise, i.e., a bank is classified as not well-capitalized for any category worse than well-capitalized, including "adequately capitalized," "undercapitalized" or "significantly or critically undercapitalized."
